会议预告 丨 “分析哲学前沿问题”工作坊（第八期）

哲学前沿

                                  主题

                    分析哲学前沿问题

                       

                        时间

                    10月26日上午9:00

                        

                        地点

                  希尔顿欢朋酒店（恒盛广场）

                     4楼精英会议室

                       

                       主办单位

                    内蒙古大学哲学学院

                山东大学（青岛）心智与认知研究所

                     

                      线上参与方式

                  腾讯会议号：298-980-786

与会者名单

陈敬坤（山西大学）

刘畅（中国人民大学）

刘小涛（上海大学）

陆丁（首都师范大学）

梅剑华（山西大学）

任会明（山东大学）

汤志恒（内蒙古大学）

吴东颖（中国科学院大学）

叶闯（山西大学）

展翼文（北京师范大学）

张文俊（华南师范大学）

张子夏（上海交通大学）

赵新侃（北京大学）

报告摘要

  张子夏:虚拟实在论还是沃顿虚构主义？

本报告将讨论虚拟实在论（virtual reality）与沃顿虚构主义（在类似以下意义上的虚构：“一群孩子在树林里玩游戏，他们把树墩想象为熊”）之间的争论焦点是什么，二者之间是否存在实质性分歧——其问题主要集中在swamp-Matrix 是不是虚拟世界，或者说，不表征非数字对象的数字世界是否为虚拟世界。报告人将给出不应把 swamp-Matrix 看作虚拟世界的理由：一是类比论证，二是对虚拟实在论直觉的揭穿。

张文俊：Interventionist Monism and Supervenient Causation

I present a new solution to the problem for interventionism posed by supervenient causation. I combine interventionism with token physicalism, and call the resultant combination “interventionist monism”. Under interventionist monism, when we intervene with a supervenient variable, we always simultaneously intervene its subvenient variable since these variables share values. However, this subvenient variable will not act as a confounder for the supervenient variable because the criterions for these variables to be causes are very different under interventionist monism.

赵新侃：The Normativity Objection and the Coloring Strategy

The normativity objection challenges normative naturalism by arguing that we have a distinctive cognitive experience when making normative judgements, finding our- selves in touch with some action-guiding authority issuing demands from outside, and that this cannot be explained naturalistically. An increasing number of natural- ists have defended their position by adopting the coloring strategy, which aims to explain away the need for positing a special property and contends that the norma- tive feel results from the intricate work of our mind which colors the world. In this paper, I critically review the extant strategies and consider what the most plausible form of the strategy would look like. I further argue that even the strategy in its most plausible form faces serious problems, that it lacks positive motivation, that it is self-defeating, and that it may well be unnecessary in the first place. As a result, the coloring strategy as a response to the normativity objection should be rejected, though it may have merits in intramural debates among naturalists.